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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED IN PART CONSIDERATION FOR THE 






This study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm 
performance. Six (6) corporate governance mechanisms were considered in a sample of 53 
FTSE 100 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2011. The mechanisms 
are; board size, board composition, board leadership, Board activity (frequency of board 
meetings), board committee (audit, remuneration and nominations) composition and 
frequency of meetings and ownership concentration.  
Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and fixed effects regression, the findings did not show 
any relationship between board size, ownership concentration (a significant negative 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁŝƚŚ dŽďŝŶ ?Ɛ Y ǁŝƚŚ ĨŝǆĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?  ? ? ?A? E ĂƵĚŝƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?
remuneration committee composition, frequency of audit and remuneration committee 
chairman CEO duality and firm performance. Contrary to expectation that increased outside 
representation on the board will increase performance (Fama and Jensen, 1993), the results 
show a significant negative relationship between board composition and firm performance. 
The results also show a negative relationship between board activity and performance. 
Similarly, a significant negative relationship between nomination committee comprising 
only NEDS and performance was also shown by my results. The findings of this study 
suggests that more than just structural compliance with corporate governance codes is 
required for a positive effect on performance, and also that governance variables are 
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